



















Abstract.  With malls and 
shopping centers a dominant 
venue of merchandising, the case 
deals with a company seeking to 
finance the construction and 
development of a strip shopping 
center in Romania. With this kind 
of financing a demanding type of 
commercial real estate credit, the 
case aims to highlight the struc-
ture and pricing of construction 
and development lending, the 
requisite financial information 
and the critical role of other 
aspects of the project. The credit 
decision process calls for 
evaluating the merits of the loan 
request and assessing the bank’s 
risk exposure. 
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Hellenic National Bank is a Boston-based institution with interstate operations 
through a network of 35 branches in select metropolitan centers in the East Coast. Its 
international department offers the customary international services, such as deposits 
and loans, transfer of funds, foreign exchange, and foreign trade financing. The bank 
maintains correspondent banking relationships with several foreign institutions and 
has two branches abroad, in London and Frankfurt. Recently the bank established a 
representative office in Bucharest, Romania, in recognition of the growth prospects of 
Eastern Europe.  
George Hart, a loan officer at Hellenic Bank, has been assigned the loan 
request of Garda Investment Associates, Ltd., a private equity investment firm, 
seeking to finance the development (e.g., such site improvements as roadways, 
installation of public utilities, and landscaping) and construction of a strip shopping 
center in Romania on land it currently owns free and clear. The shopping center will 
consist of a 33,211 square feet (sf) of net leasable area and will comprise a 27,691 sf 
retail center and a 5,520 sf outparcel restaurant building. Exhibit 1 identifies potential 
tenants (based on letters of intent) and rates for 86 percent of the rentable property (3 
bays comprising 4,642 sf remain uncommitted). The real estate agent estimates that 
the vacant bays will be leased within the next 9 months. Exhibit 2 provides a pro 
forma income and expense analysis for the first two years of operation, and Exhibit 3 
highlights two of the project’s key financial indicators.  
Construction and development of the shopping center is expected to take 15 
months to complete at a cost of $3,800,000. The client was informed of the bank’s 
practice to price such credits on the basis of the London Interbank Offered Rate or 
LIBOR, by calculating construction interest based upon the average loan balance 
during the construction phase (e.g., 60%). The rate charged is one-month LIBOR 
(currently at 0.25 percentage points) plus a spread of 3.50 percentage points, with the 
floor rate (lowest rate to be charged) set at 4.50 percentage points. Based upon the 
floor rate, the construction loan would result in interest charges of $128,250, which 
would raise the loan amount to $3,928,250. Once the shopping center is built the 
construction loan would convert into a term loan (also known as mini permanent 
financing, or mini perm). Monthly payments against the mini perm may run at 
$27,141 based upon a 25 year amortization and a 6.75 percent fixed rate, with a 
balloon payment due in 5 years.  
 
2. Borrower’s Background 
 
Garda Investment Associates Ltd., (Garda) is a Luxembourg-registered private 
equity firm engaged in real estate investment and property development in Romania. 
The company was established by Sorin Nelersa with a 40 percent limited partnership 
interest, and Claudiu Nelersa, A. Nicholson, and M. Corhana each owning 20 percent  Construction and development loan request. A case study  
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interest in the firm. The principal is a seasoned professional with twenty years of real 
estate development and management experience, and a long standing relationship with 
the Miami office of the Hellenic Bank. 
Born and raised in Galati, Romania, Sorin Nelersa moved to South Florida in 
the late 1980s. While studying for a business degree in a local university he pursued 
an employment opportunity with a real estate development firm which he joined full 
time upon his graduation. As his employer was actively engaged in commercial real 
estate development, Sorin became exposed over time to a number of projects and 
especially shopping centers in various Central and West Florida markets. For example, 
he participated in, or helped coordinate, the development of shopping centers in such 
cities as Orlando, Fort Myers, Pensacola, Sarasota and Tampa. Some of these were 
strip centers, others were neighborhood or community centers and in one instance a 
major mall (for a distinction among these types of facilities see Exhibit 4). Whatever 
the project, he enjoyed the challenge associated with it, and his hard work earned him 
successive promotions that led, within a twenty-year span and two employers later, to 
a senior position in a major condominium development company in Miami. Just as 
Sorin’s professional career seemed to rise precipitously, it suddenly came to a halt.  
 
3. Financial Crisis  
 
The financial crisis that was triggered by subprime debt in the summer of 
2007 had important implications not just for Sorin’s employer but for the real estate 
sector, the banking industry and the U.S. economy as a whole. The bursting of the 
housing market bubble precipitated a drastic drop in housing prices, which led to 
borrower defaults and eventual foreclosures, with resulting losses for banks. 
Commercial real estate came next, with many retailers retrenching during the 
recession through store closures or the renegotiation of leases with landlords--actions 
that eroded the income of the retailers and consequently the investors’ debt servicing 
ability. These conditions worsened during 2009. The onset of 2010 ushered some 
positive economic news. Unemployment seemed to stabilize and even improve, and 
consumers began to spend, returning to malls in droves. Rock-bottom interest rates 
allowed strapped developers and real estate owners to refinance on favorable terms.  
Despite some big write-downs of commercial real estate loans, most borrowers 
appeared to have had the cash flow to keep loan payments current or refinance to buy 
more time. Although some questions remain as to whether the economy had gone 
through the bottom of the cycle, the stability or rise of rents in several markets is 
viewed by some as a considerable improvement from the immediately preceding 
period. Given the reporting lag, it is felt that the bottom may have been already 
reached.  
As the crisis was unfolding in the United States and spreading to other 
developed economies, Sorin started exploring the prospects of getting back in business 
on his own. A short visit to his country of birth in 2009 made him aware of 
opportunities for shopping centers in Romania. The country had emerged from Management & Marketing 
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communism in 1989 with the overthrow of the communist regime. Although this 
development marked the beginning of a new era for Romania, it also presented a 
formidable challenge for the post revolution government. There was an immediate 
need to enact sound macroeconomic policies and transform an obsolete industrial base 
into an efficient market economy. A decade later, the reforms implemented (bolstered 
by funding from the World Bank) had produced positive results--they had transformed 
the Romanian economy into one characterized by relative economic stability, low 
unemployment and a high rate of growth. The most notable accomplishment, however, 
was the country’s admission into the European Union (January 1, 2007), with 
accession to the Eurozone projected for 2012 (or by as late as 2014, according to some 
sources). 
 The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 caused Romania to suffer a reversal 
of fortune. The years of record economic growth, fueled by easy credit and heavy 
foreign investment, gave way to a sharp slowdown that threatened an economic 
collapse. An  emergency funding in the amount of $27 billion helped cushion the 
effects of the severe  drop in private-capital inflows by facilitating implementation of 
policy measures that addressed external and fiscal imbalances and strengthened the 
financial sector. This funding consisted of a two-year standby loan of $17.6 billion 
from the International Monetary Fund and $9.5 billion from the European Union, the 
World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  These 
moves eased financing pressures and supported a drive for fiscal stability, which has 
been deemed  essential for resumption of economic development and needed 
structural reforms to place the country back on the road to convergerence with other 
EU member countries. 
Sorin’s aspirations were not deterred by the state of the Romanian economy.  
The global economic crisis had curbed Romanian exports, caused a marked slowdown 
in economic activity (GDP), and doubled the level of unemployment. Published data 
indicated a fall in the cost of labor by 20 percent and a drop in real estate values to 
2005-2006 levels. These developments, Sorin felt, played out to his benefit as they 
reduced the cost of the required investment. And if the investment financing was to be 
sourced abroad, additional cost savings were expected to result from the depreciated 
value of the Romanian currency (New Lei or RON) brought about by investors’ flight 
to stronger currencies (e.g., dollars, euros, and yen). He recognized that businesses 
that are willing to embrace considerable risk when the economy seems to be 
collapsing are amply rewarded afterwards when conditions improve and recovery sets 
in. Essentially, he felt, it was a risk/return trade off.  
 
4. Investing in Romania: Project Site 
 
It was under these circumstances that Sorin moved to establish Garda. His 
next move was to narrow down the location for his shopping center among alternate 
sites. A study he had come across indicated that with malls having opened up in 
Romania’s largest cities, investor focus was bound to shift next to smaller cities  Construction and development loan request. A case study  
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(e.g., with populations between 50,000 and 200,000) which lacked a shopping 
center.
 Another prospect would be the opening of a retail park (also known as a 
power center) featuring, besides a mall or commercial gallery, a do-it-yourself 
(DIY) store, a furniture store and a cash and carry superstore. This kind of facility is 
customarily built on the fringe of a large town, or city, because of cheaper more 
affordable land and loose planning controls that render development very easy. A 
retail park often takes away trade from busy city center retailers because of an 
abundance of free parking and access/proximity to major roads.  
After careful site analysis, Sorin became convinced that Brasov, a city in 
central Romania, offered a good prospect for a shopping center. Although the city 
already had a small number of shopping centers, the manufacturing base of the local 
economy and the growth prospects of the region supported the development of 
additional shopping centers. A city of 280,000 people, Brasov has been the capital of 
the region with several towns in close proximity, totaling a population of 600,000. 
Brasov attracted on average another 600,000 people annually who spent at least one 
night in local hotels.  Sorin spared no time in negotiating for Garda the purchase of a 
one-hectare piece of property for the (crisis) price of 400,000 euros. The property is 
adjacent to the Coresi Urban Regeneration project www.coresibrasov.ro. This project-
-managed by Centerra Capital Partners www.centerrapartners.com--aspires to develop 
a new modern urban center for Brasov encompassing all the vital city functions: retail, 
offices, residential, leisure, educational and civic spaces combined in harmonious 
synergy. The Coresi project is close enough to the old city to be convenient yet far 
enough away to not detract from its charm.   
 
5. Input from Other Professional Firms 
 
Sorin’s next move was to contract with a group of professional firms to 
address requirements at various facets of the project, and secure the appropriate 
authorizations from public authorities, as needed. An architectural firm was engaged 
to ensure compliance to building codes, zoning, environmental protection and other 
government regulations; an engineering firm for mechanical/electrical and civil 
engineering requirements; a building contractor to construct the shopping center with 
the proviso that he supplies a completion or performance bond written by an insurance 
company; and a real estate agent who secured letters of intent from the anchor firm 
and small retail tenants. Sorin also contracted a property management firm to manage 
the shopping center for a fee of 4 percentage points of effective gross income.   
Although Hellenic Bank has quoted its terms for permanent financing, Sorin 
has chosen to also inquire with an alternate source of such financing in Europe.  A 
German pension fund has indicated that it would extend this kind of financing in the 
form of a 15-year mortgage upon submission of a certificate of occupancy at 
completion of the project.  
  A file with all pertinent information has been submitted to the bank for 
consideration of the loan request. The bank in turn has hired an independent engineer Management & Marketing 
 
104
to opine on the client’s feasibility study--the architectural and engineering plan and 
construction budget. This engineering report is included in the loan file and supports 
the client’s data.   
 
6. Bank Loan Practices and Regulatory Prescription  
 
Shopping center construction financing is a type of commercial real estate 
loan which many banks make. Whether financing land development and/or 
construction, these loans are very profitable and are extremely attractive to growth-
oriented banks. However, they can be highly speculative if made against properties 
that do not generate predictable cash flows, or the underlying assumptions of cash 
flows do not materialize. Many banks, savings and loans, insurance companies and 
pension funds have ended up owning (repossessing) real estate credits that do not 
produce sufficient cash to service extended loans. If market prices are depressed, 
banks and other lenders keep these loans on their books to avoid taking losses.  
Construction loans are generally short term loans and represent interim 
financing until permanent (long term) financing is arranged in the form of a mortgage 
from a bank, insurance company or a pension fund. Construction loan maturities may 
be extended when developers cannot find permanent financing.  A bank extending a 
construction loan to a builder disburses the funds on a monthly basis, based on actual 
contractor bills presented to the banker and subject to inspection verification.  
The higher rates of return and commensurate risks associated with 
construction loans have prompted US bank regulators to introduce uniform standards 
for real estate lending activities. One such regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC) which oversees the activities of federally-chartered banks, 
requires national banks (such as Hellenic National Bank) to adopt written real estate 
lending policies that are consistent with safe and sound banking practices and are 
appropriate to the size of the bank and the nature and scope of its operations. A 
representative set of OCC pronouncements is identified below under appropriate 
headings. 
 
6.1. Commercial Construction Lending Risks 
 
With construction loans vulnerable to a wide variety of risks, a bank must 
properly assess the developer's expertise and financial strength to complete the 
construction project within specified cost and time limits. When evaluating the 
likelihood that a proposed construction project will be successful, a bank should be 
aware of the following risks: 
• Failure to complete the project by the agreed take-out date voids a commitment 
for permanent financing. 
• Cost overruns occur and may exceed the take-out commitment (permanent 
financing arrangement) or the sale price of the completed project.   Construction and development loan request. A case study  
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• For example, inclement weather, material or labor shortages, or substandard 
work that must be redone to pass inspection can delay completion, increase 
interest expense, and cause the total cost of the project to exceed the original 
budget. 
• Completed project is an economic failure. 
• Progress payments diverted by developer prompting suppliers and subcontractors 
to file mechanics liens for non-payment of debts. 
• General contractor files for bankruptcy before completing the project. 
• Labor disputes or the failure of a major supplier or subcontractor to deliver 
goods and services. 
• Uninsured destruction of completed work or work in process. 
 
6.2. Underwriting Standards 
 
Prudently underwritten real estate loans should reflect all relevant credit 
factors, including: 
• The capacity of the borrower, or income from the underlying property, to 
adequately service principal and interest on the debt. This can be measured 
through the “debt service coverage” ratio (number of times net operating income 
will cover annual debt service). While minimum ratio requirements will vary 
between banks and by type of project, they usually fall within the range of 1.05 
to 1.5. 
• The value of the mortgaged property. 
• The overall creditworthiness of the borrower including the demands of 
supporting other projects. 
• The level of equity invested in the property by the borrower. 
• Any secondary sources of repayment. 
• Any additional collateral or credit enhancements, such as mortgage insurance, 
take-out commitments, or guarantees. In the latter case the bank should obtain 
information on the   guarantor's financial condition and capacity to fulfill the 
obligation if the borrower defaults on the loan. 
• Extension of credit should be consistent with the bank’s internal loan-to-value 
(LTV) limits and should not exceed supervisory limits for the specific real estate 
category. 
 
6.3. Evaluating the Collateral  
 
Real estate loans are made with a reasonable probability that the borrower will 
have sufficient cash flow to meet the repayment terms. However, with the value of the 
collateral a significant factor affecting lending risk, it is essential for the bank to rely 
on an independent and objective valuation of the real estate collateral. This valuation Management & Marketing 
 
106
would assure the bank that the completed project will provide adequate collateral 
coverage of the loan. To this end the bank should, at a minimum, obtain an "as is" 
appraisal of the market value of the property. Banks also normally request that the 
appraiser report the "as completed" value of the project when a stabilized level of 
occupancy is achieved. When reviewing the reasonableness of the facts and 
assumptions associated with the value of the collateral, the lending institution may 
take into account such considerations as: 
• Current and projected vacancy and absorption rates. 
• Lease renewal trends and anticipated rents. 
• Volume and trends in past due leases. 
• Effective rental rates or sale prices.  
• Net operating income of the property as compared with budget projections. 
• Discount rates (net present value of the future net operating income stream) and 
direct capitalization rates (how fast an investment will pay for itself) 
 
6.4. Warning Signs for Problem Real Estate Loans  
 
A number of early warning signs, such as delinquency in the payment of 
interest, could indicate potential problems with individual real estate construction 
loans. Other warning signs could include: 
  An excess of similar projects under construction or completed and not 
leased/sold. 
  A pattern of increasing marketing periods or increasing concessions and 
declining effective rents for similar projects. 
  Construction delays or other events that could lead to cost overruns that 
may require  renegotiation of loan terms. 
  A feasibility study or analysis that fails to reflect current and reasonably 
anticipated market conditions 
  Subsequent changes to the initial concept or plan of construction (e.g., 
because of unfavorable market conditions). 
  Other indications of potential or actual difficulties in a bank's commercial 
real estate portfolio may include:  
  Rent concessions or sales discounts that cause the borrower to have less 
cash flow than projected in the original feasibility study or appraisal. 
  Unusually generous concessions on tenant space, moving expenses, and 
lease buyouts. 
  Slow leasing, the lack of sustained sales activity, or sales cancellations that 
could reduce a project's income potential, thereby leading to protracted repayment or 
default on the loan. 
  Delinquent lease payments from major tenants. 
 
  Construction and development loan request. A case study  
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7. Credit Guidelines  
 
With all the pertinent information in the client’s file, George must decide on 
the merit of the loan request. To make up his mind on whether or not to recommend 
the credit to the bank’s loan committee, he thought appropriate to review the strengths 
and weaknesses of the request, highlight the critical issues, and develop the reasoning 
behind his decision.  
Your assignment is to address the following issues:  
1.  Identify at least three positives and three negatives about the Garda loan 
request (present these points in the form of bullet statements or phrases)  
2.  Discuss the major issues associated with the loan request 
3.  Determine whether or not the bank should make the loan and discuss the 
reasoning behind your recommendation (select only one of the two alternatives below) 
  If you decide in favor of the loan, clarify whether you would extend 
both construction and development financing, or just construction given 
the availability of permanent financing from a third party. Further, 
identify any terms or conditions you deem appropriate to safeguard the 
bank’s claim.  
  If, on the other hand, you decide against the loan, on what grounds 
would you turn down the request?  
4.  If the loan were to be made, could the company lock in the cost of 
financing by hedging against interest rate risk? 
             Table 1  
Tenants, Lease Commitments, and Rates 
 
  Date Lease    Annual Rate 
Tenant  s  Begins  Ends    Sq. Ft.    $ Rent/SF* 
Burger King  10/5/2012          10/4/2032  5,520  $31.50 
Marfin Laiki Bank  10/4/2012  10/3/2022  2,050  $36.54 
Furniture store  10/3/2012  10/2/2019  4,006  $31.95 
Arts and Craft  10/6/2012          10/5/2017  1,055  $31.85 
Jewelry    10/9/2012          10/8/2017  2,333 $31.00 
Dry Cleaning  10/8/2012          10/7/2017  1,650  $30.00 
Beauty Salon  10/2/2012  3/1/2018  1,960  $28.00 
Optical 
accessories 
10/13/2012         10/12/2017  1,995  $22.00 
Clothing/Footwear  10/22/2012            2/1/2019  8,000  $15.00 
3 Vacant      n.a.         n.a.    4,642    -- 
*Converted at current dollar exchange rates  
Note: The rental rate for the Clothing/Footwear tenant will increase to $20/sf  in 2013 and $26 
thereafter. 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
 Management & Marketing 
 
108
Table 2  
Proforma Income and Expense Analysis, 2013-2014 
 
 Lease    Annual 
Rate 
2013 2013  2014 




Burger King  10/4/2032  5,520         $31.50  $14,490.00  $173,880  $173,880 
Marfin Laiki  10/3/2022  2,050  $36.5443  $6,243.00  $74,916  $74,916 
Furniture store  10/2/2019  4,006  $31.95  $10,667.67  $128,000  $128,000 
Arts and Craft  10/5/2017  1,055  $31.85  $2,800.00  $33,600  $33,600 
Jewelry  10/8/2017  2,333  $31.00  $6,026.92  $72,323    $72,323 
Dry Cleaning  10/7/2017  1,650      $30.00  $4,125.00  $49,500  $49,500 
Beauty Salon  3/1/2018  1,960  $28.00  $4,573.33  $54,880    $54,880 
Optical 10/12/2017 
 
1,995 $22.00 $3,657.50  $43,890  $43.890 
Clothing/Foot  2/1/2019  8,000  $20.00  $13,333.34    160,000  $208,000 
Vacant   1,256  $22.00  $2,302.67  $27,632  $27,632 
Vacant    1,965      $22.00  $3,602.50  $43,230  $43,230 
Vacant   1,421  $22.00  $2,605.17    $31,262  $31,262 
Total Rental 
Revenue 
     $ 74,426.08  $893,113  $941,113 
                                               
Other Income/ 
Common Area Maintenance Recovery (CAM)* 
Furniture store  4,006         $5.00    $20,030     $20,030 
Dry Cleaning  1,650         $5.00     $8,250      $8,250 
Optical    1,995         $5.00   $9,975        $9,975 
Clothing/Foot.  8,000         $4.00   $32,000               $32,000 
Other    12,918       $4.00   $51,672               $51,672  
Vacant    4,642        $4.00    $18,568               $18,568 
Total Revenue & Other Income               $1,033,608         $1,081,608 
 
Less: Market vacancy factor 10%    $103,361          $108,161 
Effective Gross Income (EGI)                $930,247          $973,447 
 
 
   2013  2014 
Expenses      $ Rate per SF  Annual Amount     Annual Amount 
Real Estate Taxes    4.81  $159,650  $159,650 
Insurance  2.37  78,820  78,820 
Management Fee (4% 
of EGI) 
1.08  46,858  48,586 
Administration  0.53  17,500  17,500 
Repairs & Maintenance  2.67  88,580  88,580 
Utilities   0.99  33,024  33,024 
Reserves 0.20  6,642  6,642  Construction and development loan request. A case study  
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   2013  2014 
Total Expenses  12.65    $431,075  $432,802 
Net Operating Income    $499,172  $540,645 
Debt Service    $325,692  $325,692 
Excess cash flow     $173,480  $214,953 
* Common Area Maintenance (CAM) Recovery--known also as triple net lease--represents 
some or all of the property expenses normally to be paid by the property owner (landlord) 
passed on to the tenant to pay, in addition to the rent. These include expenses such real estate 
taxes, insurance, maintenance, repairs and other items predetermined when the lease is signed.  
Source: Author’s analysis. 
 
Table 3 
Key Financial Indicators 
Debt Service Coverage ratio (DSCR) 
Net Operating Income/Debt Service               1.53x        1.66x 
Project Valuation* 
Net Operating Income: $499,172 
Est. Capitalization Rate: 9.00%   
Estimated Project Value: $5,546,356 
 
*As per BRE Appraisal Services of Bucharest. 
Source: Author’s analysis. 
Table 4 
Terms and Definitions 
 
Anchor Tenant:  A large national or regional retailer that serves as a primary draw for a shopping center; 
a store strategically located in a retail property in order to enhance, bring attention to, or increase traffic at 
the property.  Sometimes called a “destination” tenant, usually these tenants lease at least 25,000 square 
feet (sf). 
Community Center:  A shopping center development that has a total square footage between 100,000-
350,000 sf.  Generally it will have 2-3 large anchored tenants, but not department store anchors.  A  
Community Center typically offers a wider range of apparel and other soft goods than a Neighborhood 
Center.  Among the more common anchors are supermarkets and super drugstores.  Community Center 
tenants often include retailers selling such items as apparel, home improvement/furnishings, toys, 
electronics or sporting goods.  The center is usually configured as a strip, in a straight line, or an “L” or 
“U” shape. 
Developer:  The company, entity or individual that transforms raw land to improved property by use of 
labor, capital and entrepreneurial efforts. 
Freestanding Retail:  Single tenant building with a retail tenant.  Examples include video stores, and fast 
food restaurants. 
Lifestyle Center:  An upscale, specialty retail, main street concept shopping center.  An open center, 
usually without anchors, about 300,000 sf gross leasing area (GLA) or larger, is located near affluent 
neighbourhoods and includes upscale retail, trendy restaurants and entertainment retail.  Nicely 
landscaped, it offers convenient parking located close to the stores. 
Mall:  The combined retail center types of Lifestyle Center, Regional Mall and Super Regional Mall. 
Neighborhood Center:  Provides for the sales of convenience goods (food, drugs, etc.) and personal 
services (laundry, dry cleaning, etc.) for day-to-day living needs of the immediate neighborhood with a Management & Marketing 
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supermarket being the principal tenant.  In theory, the typical GLA is 50,000 sf while in practice it may 
range from 30,000 to 100,000 sf. 
Power Center:  The center typically consists of several freestanding (unconnected) anchors and only a 
minimum amount of small specialty tenants.  250,000-600,000 sf. A Power Center is dominated by 
several large anchors, including discount department stores, off-price stores, warehouse clubs or 
“category killers,” i.e., stores that offer tremendous selection in a particular merchandise category at low 
prices. 
Shopping Center:  The combined retail center types of Community Center, Neighborhood Center and 
Strip Center. 
Strip Center:  A strip center is an attached row of stores or service outlets managed as a coherent retail 
entity, with on-site parking usually located in front of the stores.  Open canopies may connect the 
storefronts, but a strip center does not have enclosed walkways linking the stores.  A strip center may be 
configured in a straight line, or have “L” or “U” shape. 
Super Regional Mall:  Similar to a regional mall, but because of its larger size, a super regional mall has 
more anchors, a deeper selection of merchandise, and draws from a larger population base.  As with 
regional malls, the typical configuration is an enclosed mall, frequently with multiple levels (See also: 
Regional Mall). 
Theme/Festival Center:  These centers typically employ a unifying theme that is carried out by the 
individual shops in their architectural design and, to an extent, in their merchandise. Often the biggest 
appeal of these centers is to tourists, and they can be anchored by restaurants and entertainment 
facilities.  These centers generally located in urban areas, tend to be adapted from older, sometimes 
historic, buildings, and can be part of mixed-use projects. 80,000-250,000 sf. 
 
Source:  CoStar Group Inc., 2010, pp. D-E. 
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